Wow! There is so much going on here. I can't believe you're not logging!

* First it starts out as a simple maze puzzle game.

* Then it there're weird layouts where people are clicking stuff, and pathways are opening up randomly.

* Then you realise it's not random at all, people have to click things for pathways to open.

* Then you realise someone has to stay behind and sacrifice themselves for other people to go through.

* Then there're levels where multiple people have to coordinate and click at the same time to open n layers gates.

* Then there're levels where not only do you have to stay behind, you have to go out of your way to do so. So you'll be letting people through for a while, you realise, as it's more efficient for the group as a whole. At some point you have to decide you've taken your turn and you move towards the main gate and wait, and then new people come and then they have to realise to go to press the key.

* So next level you see someone sacrificing themselves and you decide instead to go take their place and wiggle your mouse to tell them to go. "I got this", you indicate.

* Now some people have got it into their head this is all about cooperation and selflessness. So you can be waiting in one of these buttons in the middle of nowhere, letting people through for a minute, and a new guy will start making their way towards you to let you go, and you draw "thanks" on your way out, they wiggle their mouse to say "welcome" and off you go, leaving them behind.

* On some levels, not only did people have to coordinate at the same time, but things had to be done in sequence. On one, there wasn't enough people to hit all buttons at once, so we coordinated where you would unwrap the "outer" layer of wall protecting the exit, and a couple people would move inside, then you'd unwrap another inner layer, and so on, until they could get out. Finally, you'd decide your turn was over and go wait the same way. It took quite a while before this was figured out collectively -- but once newcomers saw how it was done it went in one smooth operation until I got out and onto another maze.

And that's to say nothing of the selfish people who just passed through maze after maze. In one maze people were waiting, and I and another were at the buttons, but there was one other. One of them had to realise they needed to sacrifice themselves. We were both wiggling our mouses to indicate so, but they didn't see it.

There's also the way people will follow you in the maze if you look confident, and the way people will draw on the right exit to help people out. I'd try to leave a trail if I'd had the right exit cracked in the maze.

In a way I think the inability to write and communicate is fantastic: you can't just tell someone "do this". They have to figure out that they need to collaborate, they have to have some kind of intuitive social empathy that puts the needs of the many against the needs of the few.

Genuinely, mate, this is the most fascinating "game" I've played in a long time. And I can't believe you're not logging it all! I'm sure game theorists and psychologists would love to get their hands on this kind of data. I thought it was a real experiment done for research.

Glad I got to play this while 700 people were on it, I think that really made for some great interactions. It felt like being part of some kind of military team.

This is a fun slide deck, but if you'll forgive me for sucking some of the mystique out of it: it's just a reframing of DJB's hobby horses:

* The group that standardized AES rejected cache timing as a viable attack vector: http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf --- more generally, that constant-time algorithms and constructions (a feature of virtually all of Bernstein's work for the last 15+ years) aren't taken seriously in industry. Also helpful to know: there's a defensible argument that Bernstein more or less started AES cache timing research.

* Side-channel attacks weren't taken seriously by TLS, and Bernstein is affiliated with one of the research groups that found a TLS side-channel attack: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html

* Application-layer randomness is a bad idea, and, like Nacl does, everyone should just use a single, carefully audit kernel RNG: http://blog.cr.yp.to/20140205-entropy.html

* Protocols and constructions should be designed to minimize dependence on randomness, the way DJB's EdDSA does: http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/ed25519-20110926.pdf

* Crypto performance is both not taken seriously as a research goal and an excuse for the deployment of terrible cryptography. This isn't so much a hobby horse of DJB's as it is his entire research career: http://cr.yp.to/cv/research-net-20070115.pdf

* DNSSEC, with its core design goals of "sign-only", "sign offline", and "sign from the root down" is a terrible idea. A sane design would look more like DNSCurve: http://dnscurve.org/ (helps also to know that DJB has a longstanding feud with both the design team for BIND, the flagship DNSSEC implementation, and with Namedroppers, the IETF DNS standardization list).

Unsurprisingly, considering the source, these are all really great important ideas. Bernstein is one of my heroes, and I'm certainly not trying to take him down a peg here. I just thought it might be interesting for people to know that this deck is less a revelation about cryptography than it is a survey of DJB's research over the last 15 years.

I'm surprised he didn't take more time on RC4, which he was closely involved with breaking. The story about how something as dazzlingly broken as RC4 could have gotten so entrenched in the industry is much more interesting than the story about how AES was standardized despite its performance relying so much on table lookups.

From the source:

.....

> Why don't you do that [i.e. vote against systemd] yourselves?

>

> We are excluded from voting on the issue: only few of us

> have the time and patience to interact with Debian on a

> voluntary basis.

.....

In that case, you don't have the time and patience to operate and maintain a worthwhile and ongoing Debian fork.

In that case, there is no substance to the "question" you're raising, because you wouldn't actually do what you're calling for.

In that case, you're just a handful of guys (or maybe even just one guy) who spent $10 on a domain name... to get more attention for your Slashdot/Reddit/HN post than it otherwise would have had if posted straight to Slashdot/Reddit/HN directly.